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STARVING THE TROLL: USING THE
CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION TO DETER
ABUSIVE PATENT LITIGATION
IThis business is not based on what1s right or what1s
wrong . . . . It1s based on fear. Nobody would pay you for a
patent unless they feared that the consequences of not
paying you vastly exceed the consequences of paying.51
INTRODUCTION
Many scholars and practitioners agree that non-practicing entities
(NPEs), patent holders who do not use their patent but for filing
infringement lawsuits, are increasingly burdening the patent system. While
there are many different types of NPEsc -QJ/+l)K'QHh I0/j0 l* N-l)Q0)
trolls,8 those that target end users2 to obtain licensing fees are seen as the
most nefarious. 3 These NPEs use the threat of expensive litigation as
leverage for extorting a licensing fee for what are usually weak patents.
Often, the manufacturer of the product is procedurally unable to protect its
customers from these actions and is forced to watch as the customers
acquiesce to the frivolous licensing demands.
Congress and the judiciary have attempted to solve this problem, 4
mostly in the form of diminishing the leverage patent trolls have in
litigation. However, each enacted solution has merely resulted in the NPE
adapting its strategy. There has yet to be a significant decline in the number
of NPE filings. Therefore, another round of patent reform is necessary to
give the entities opposing the patent trollsPnot just the ones who have
lawsuits filed against them, but also the small retailer who is one of
thousands to receive a letter demanding licensing feesPtools to combat the
problem. This Note argues that an expansion of the customer suit exception5
is the only viable option available at the moment to protect both classes of
non-manufacturer NPE victims. Part I gives a brief background on the
NPEs position in the patent landscape. Part II discusses how the current
options available to customers for patent infringement lawsuits fail to deter
1. The Symbol/Cognex-Lemelson Patent Battle, GROKLAW (Aug. 22, 2005, 11:05 AM),
http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20050822040508297 (quoting Gerald Hosier,
attorney for Jerome Lemelson, a patent troll that received $1.5 billion in license agreements).
2. End users are entities at the end of a product supply chain.
3. For purposes of this Note, NPE and patent troll will be used interchangeably.
4. See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 687, 694 (2012)a N[NPEs] are generally viewed as a problem that plagues the patent
system a a a a8 Id. at 692.
5. 3LQ0 l 2l0(OlT)(+Q+4* T(*)/2Q+ K* SQOQ0SK0M l -l)Q0) K0O+K0MQ2Q0) THlK2 kl*QS /n the
2l0(OlT)(+Q+4* -+/S(T)c )LQ T(*)/2Q+ *(K) QiTQ-)K/0 lHH/j* )LQ 2l0(OlT)(+Q+ )/ OKHQ l SQTHl+l)/+h
judgment action against the plaintiff seeking a finding of noninfringement. The lawsuit against the
customer would then be stayed pending conclusion of )LQ 2l0(OlT)(+Q+4* SQTHl+l)/+h J(SM2Q0)
action.
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patent troll activities. Part III shows that the heightened pleading standards
and fee shifting options from the most current reform proposal will not
diminish trivial NPE lawsuit filings. Finally, Part IV explains why an
expansion of the customer suit exception is the best option for protecting
customer defendants from patent trolls.
I. BACKGROUND
Patent infringement is statutorily defined as Nwhoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States . . . .86 The purpose of a patent is to promote innovation.7 The
temporary monopoly a patent provides gives the inventor a chance to
exploit the market and recover its investment; thus, there is more incentive
for innovative activities.8 However, recent trends in patent litigation have
led to patents being used as tools for litigation rather than mechanisms to
promote innovation. 9 NPEs neither develop new technologies nor
participate directly in the market, but instead acquire patents for the purpose
of extracting license fees by making threats of litigation.10
Patent trolls entered the intellectual property law spotlight in NTP, Inc.
v. Research in Motion, Ltd.11 NTP, Inc.4s (NTP) primary assets were a
collection of patents. It had no employees and was operated from an
attorney4s home.12 NTP sued Research in Motion, Ltd. (RIM), alleging its
BlackBerry email integration technology infringed NTP patents. 13 The
litigation resulted in a jury finding that RIM had infringed NTP4s patents,
an award of $54 million in damages to NTP, and most importantly, a
permanent injunction enjoining RIM from further manufacture, use,
importation, or sale of all accused BlackBerry systems.14 During the appeal,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) re-examined NTP4s patents
and ultimately found that all were invalid, a finding that would have
prevented NTP from obtaining any remedy for infringement of the
patents. 15 However, the fear that an injunction would stop service to
BlackBerrys worldwide forced RIM into a $612.5 million settlement prior
to the USPTO4s invalidity findings.16 The NTP case is exemplary of the
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
7. See WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE
SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 2 (2013).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Gregory d4Incelli, Has Ebay Spelled the End of Patent Troll Abuses? Paying the Toll: The
Rise (and Fall?) of the Patent Troll, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 343, 346 (2009).
11. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
12. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 21.
13. See id.
14. Incelli, supra note 10, at 345. The injunction was stayed pending appeal. Id. at 345 n.7.
15. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 21.
16. See id. (the settlement included licensing fees for past and future use of the NTP
technology).
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major criticisms of patent trolls, including their practice of extorting
settlements, asserting weak patents, and enjoying significant leverage.
First, trolls obtain patents primarily to extort settlements and license
fees.17 The NTP case shows how one type of trollPthe Nlottery-ticket8
trollPmakes its money.18 Lottery-ticket trolls hold patents they hope are
valid and infringed, and are interested in jury awards against big players in
the industry. 19 In the past, a permanent injunction would be awarded
alongside any jury damages in patent cases.20 The injunction became a very
powerful tool for the patent troll, allowing them to charge exorbitant
licensing fees.21 However, in eBay v. MercExchange, the United States
Supreme Court held that patent cases were subject to the traditional four-
factor test for the granting of an injunction.22 One such factor being that the
party seeking injunctive relief had to be a market competitor. Because most
patent trolls do not manufacture or sell anything related to the patent,
plaintiffs4 requests for injunctive relief began to get systematically denied.23
This helped level the litigation playing field.24
However, there is another type of troll that the injunctive relief holding
did not have much of an effect on. This groupPlabeled as Nbottom-feeder8
or Nnuisance-value8Pis interested in quick, low-value settlements or
license fees.25 These types rely on the high cost of litigation to compel
parties they sue to settle, rather than pay millions in attorney fees.26 This
business model usually involves acquiring many questionable patents27 and
asserting them against large numbers of Nunsophisticated purchasers,8
rather than manufacturers.28
17. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009).
18. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013).
19. Id.
20. See Incelli, supra note 10, at 352 (N[A]bsent an unusual case . . . 6a permanent injunction
will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.48e fciting MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
21. Id. at 353 n.55.
22. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 25 (NA plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) that the remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.8e fquoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391 (2006)).
23. Incelli, supra note 10, at 360R61.
24. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 26.
25. Lemley, supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007) (stating that these types of trolls will acquire their
patents at bankruptcy sales and on the open-market).
28. Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law1s Customer Suit Exception, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1609R10 (2013).
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Certain aspects of the patent system have contributed to the viability of
nuisance-value trolls. The patent system ensures that there is a large supply
of patents, both high and low quality, and potential defendants to assert
them against. In recent years, the USPTO has been understaffed, leading to
a less rigorous examination of patent applications.29 This has led to a culture
where USPTO examiners approve most applications and shift the burden of
resolving infringement disputes onto the patent holders. 30 Further, the
Patent Act31 supplies a large population of defendants. Specifically, section
271 of the Patent Act32 gives patent holders the option to sue almost any
entity that comes in contact with the patented item along the stream of
commerce, from the original manufacturer down to the retailer or end
user. 33 For example, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, a well-known NPE,
exploited the nuisance-value model rather recently. After obtaining patents
related to wireless technology, Innovatio mailed over 8,000 letters alleging
patent infringement to coffee shops, restaurants and the like that offered
Wi-Fi services to their customers.34 Innovatio demanded each merchant pay
it several thousand dollars, a fraction of what attorney fees would be, to
license the technology or Innovatio would bring a lawsuit.35 These trolls
take advantage of the asymmetric cost in patent litigation to extort
settlements.36
A second criticism of patent trolls, particularly the nuisance-value
trolls, is that they primarily assert weak patents.37 Since their goal is to
settle long before validity and infringement are determined, they have the
freedom to use lower quality patents.38 They understand, however, that not
every letter they send out will result in acquiescence to the licensing terms
they offer.39 When this happens, the trolls are not afraid to commence
litigation even though they know the patent is weak.40 The theory behind
this strategy has been called Npredatory patent litigation8 and relies on the
29. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 7 (citations omitted) (noting that it has Nnot been
uncommon for 3,000 patent examiners to handle over 350,000 patent applications annually8).
30. William F. Shughart II, Foreword to WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS:
PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION, at xii (2013).
31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1R376 (2012).
32. Id. § 271(a).
33. See Love, supra note 28, at 1612R13.
34. SeeWATKINS, supra note 7, at 18.
35. See id. at 19.
36. See Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Dana Rao, Vice President and
Associate General Counsel for Intellectual Property Litigation, Adobe Systems, Inc.).
37. Id. at 2128.
38. Id.
39. See Erik Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities Use
Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents 2 (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2308115 (explaining that some licensing demands will be ignored
or rejected based on a belief that the litigation threat is non-credible).
40. Id. at 3.
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NPE gaining a litigious reputation.41 Since an overwhelming majority of
patent infringement litigation gets settled, these cases based on weak
patents do not get to the judicial stage of validity determination.42 However,
the litigation still imposes significant costs on both sides. 43 All this is
observed by the other potential defendants, who view the troll4s threat as
more credible, and are thus more amenable to the U<^4* licensing terms.44
In the end, the short financial loss suffered in the beginning is recouped
over time through the subsequent licensing agreements.45
The final criticism is that NPEs have significant leverage with very
little to lose.46 Since patent trolls, by definition, do not actually practice
their patents within the industry, they are essentially invulnerable to
countersuit from an alleged infringer. 47 In non-NPE patent litigation,
involving two opposing competitors each with its own patent portfolio, the
result is often a reasonable cross-licensing arrangement. 48 These
arrangements arise because it is likely that each side owns patents used by
the other. Therefore, litigation in these circumstances would result in a
degree of mutually assured destruction.49 NPEs, on the other hand, do not
participate in the market and thus have no interest in these cooperative
arrangements.50
Furthermore, recipients of letters from the nuisance-value trolls
demanding licensing fees have a limited choice of judicial forums if they
want to pursue a declaratory judgment of invalidity or infringement.51 In
determining what forum is appropriate for such an action, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the Federal Circuit) 52 does not allow
district courts to consider where the allegedly infringing items are
produced.53 If the alleged infringer cannot meet the personal jurisdiction
41. Id. at 2.
42. See id. at 2R3.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Incelli, supra note 10, at 347.
47. Id. at 348 n.22.
48. Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
336, 340 (2005).
49. Incelli, supra note 10, at 348R49.
50. Id.
51. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 23 (explaining that under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, a federal
district court may declare the rights or legal relations of an interested party about whether or not
further relief could be sought).
52. The Federal Circuit, created by Congress in 1982 as part of the Federal Courts
Z2-+/'Q2Q0) #T)c Ll* l N(0K,(Q J(+K*SKT)K/0lH *)+(T)(+Q> K)* l--QHHl)Q J(+K*SKT)K/0 K* SQOK0QS kh
subject matter rather than geography, and it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
THlK2*a8 Vl))hew R. Huppert, Note, Commercial Purpose: Reevaluating Asahi Through the Lens
of International Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 624 (2011).
53. See id. at 24 (NTo determine [where a] declaratory judgment action can be filed . . . the
court will ask whether (1) the troll purposefully availed its activities at residents of the forum, (2)
the claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
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requirements, they must either wait for the NPE to bring suit or file the
declaratory judgment action where the NPE is located, which is often a
NPE friendly district.54
Nevertheless, efforts have been made to tame the trolls. One of the first
major attempts to curtail the negative effect of trolls was the passage of the
Patent Act of 1999.55 Trolls were manipulating the USPTO4s application
procedures to create Nsubmarine patents8Ppatents that remained hidden
until a large company spent significant sums of money developing a
technology that infringed upon the patent.56 The troll would then quickly
attempt to get the patent issued and Nhold up8 the company for exorbitant
royalties.57 The Patent Act of 1999 attempted to address this problem by
requiring patent applications to be published eighteen months after filing.58
However, patent trolls can easily get around this publication requirement by
certifying that they will not file a patent in another country.59
The judicial branch responded with its decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.60 In eBay, the Supreme Court put an end to the
automatic issuance of permanent injunctions in patent cases after
infringement and validity were established.61 This decision extinguished a
component of the lottery-ticket troll4s business method. However, this
holding did not affect the nuisance-value troll, 62 leaving them free to
continue sending mass amounts of licensing demands.63
Soon thereafter, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA). 64
Prior to enactment of the AIA, NPEs would bring a single infringement suit
reasonable and fair. . . . [A declaratory judgment action] 6neither directly arises out of nor relates
to the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing of arguably infringing products . . . but
instead arises out of or relates to the activities of the [troll] in enforcing the patent.48e fciting
Avocent Huntsville, Corp. v. Aten Int4l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
54. See id. at 29R30 (explaining that the Eastern District of Texas leads the United States in
patent cases because it is notoriously friendly to plaintiffs, who win 78% of the timePlikely a
result of complicated cases presented in front of uneducated juries).
55. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. In Support of Petitioner at 9, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 288 (2006) (No. 05-130).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012).
59. See id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (NIf an applicant makes a request upon filing, certifying that the
invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in
another country . . . that requires publication of applications 18 months after filing, the application
shall not be published as provided in paragraph (1)a8).
60. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
61. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 25.
62. See Todd Klein, Ebay v. Mercexchange and KSR Int1l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 308 (2007) (stating that the
main result of the shift away from near automatic permanent injunctions is that companies
accused of infringing a patent will be more likely to litigate to judgment).
63. This is because the nuisance-value troll targets groups that would rather pay cheap
licensing fees than partake in any litigation.
64. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-129, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2012)).
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against a large number of defendants from many different forums.65 This
strategy gave NPEs at least two distinct advantages. First, it decreased the
trolls4 litigation costs by allowing them to only litigate common issues
once, rather than putting on the same evidence at multiple trials in multiple
forums. 66 Second, and more importantly, the trolls were practically
guaranteed a favorable venue.67 By cherry-picking defendants that were
either located in the NPE4s venue, or who sold the infringing product there,
the NPEs were able to establish personal jurisdiction.68 A defendant could
ask the district court to transfer the case to another district as long as it is
N[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.869
However, with a large number of geographically diverse defendants, it is
almost impossible to win such a motion because there is no district clearly
more convenient for all the defendants. 70 Therefore, if the action was
brought in the NPE friendly Eastern District of Texas, where patent
plaintiffs win 78% of the time,71 the NPE could obtain an early advantage.
The AIA changed this.
When President Obama signed the AIA on September 16, 2011 it was
the first major reform of U.S. patent law in over half a century. 72 An
important section of this Act set a much more rigorous standard for
plaintiffs to join defendants in the same suit.73 This provision demanded
more of a connection between defendants than infringement of the same
patent. Rather, their cases had to arise out of the same transaction.74 The
ideal result would have been an increase in the number of cases filed by
NPEs, 75 but a net decrease in the number of defendants being sued. 76
However, while this was the effect initially, as there was a decrease in the
number of defendants being sued by patent trolls from 4,889 in 2011 to
3,696 in 2012, the trolls have since begun to rebound and the number of
defendants in patent troll litigations increased to 4,123 in 2013. 77
Furthermore, the AIA has little to no effect on nuisance-value NPEs that
send out thousands of letters merely threatening litigation.
65. Bryant, supra note 4, at 688.
66. Id. at 691.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 691R92. A patent infringement defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction within
the location of its principal place of business and anywhere the patent is infringed, (i.e. sold,
offered for sale, used, or imported). Furthermore, it only takes a single instance of infringement
within the state to establish personal jurisdiction.
69. Id. at 692 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
70. Id.
71. See WATKINS, supra note 7, at 29.
72. Bryant, supra note 4, at 694.
73. Id. at 695.
74. Id.
75. Because the NPEs would have to file a suit for each defendant.
76. Bryant, supra note 4, at 703.
77. See RPX CORP., 2013 NPE LITIGATION REPORT, at 14 (2014),
https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RPX-2013-NPE-Litigation-Report.pdf.
256 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
II. CURRENT CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION FOR BUYERS
Current contract law has two protective measures for customers78 who
purchase a product which is later alleged to infringe a patent. First, the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides protection for all purchase
agreements. Second, more sophisticated customers can request explicit
indemnification clauses in their contracts for the sale of goods. While both
of these offer valuable protection to the downstream user of a product, who
does not and should not know they may be infringing a patent, they do little
to deter patent troll activity and merely shift the costs to the manufacturers.
A. THEUNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE
In UCC section 2-312(3),79 the UCC grants a warranty against claims of
patent infringement by a third party.80 To be protected by this provision, a
customer needs to purchase the item from a Nmerchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind8 and be subject to a N+KML)O(H THlK28 of infringement.81
The first qualification, Nmerchant,8 has been interpreted quite broadly,82 but
the second, Nrightful claim,8 has no set definition, which has led to
inconsistent rulings in the courts.83
The term Nmerchant8 is defined by the UCC as Na person who . . . holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved.884 Most sellers will fall under the Nmerchant8 category because
most businesses regularly deal the goods in question and an individual
inventor would likely be considered to have special knowledge.85 While this
interpretation is quite broad, there are limitations. If a buyer purchases
noninfringing components and assembles them into an infringing product,
they cannot seek indemnification from the manufacturer of the component
78. The importance of speaking about protections provided to customers is that all end users
are, in their nature, customersPthey purchase the product they are using from some entity.
Therefore, any protection provided to customers for purchases made would also, theoretically,
apply to end users. However, it should be noted that not all customers are end users. For example,
in a supply chain where a manufacturer sells widgets to a retailer who in turn sells a widget to a
person both the retailer and person are customers, but only the person would be an end user.
79. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM4N 2012) (NUnless otherwise
agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the good
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like .
a a a8).
80. Bradley W. Scheer, Indemnification for Patent Infringement Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 34 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 7 (2006R2007).
81. U.C.C. § 2-312(3).
82. See Scheer, supra note 80, at 7R8.
83. See Karen E. Sandrik, Warranting Rightful Claims, 72 LA. L. REV. 873, 877 (2012)
(explaining that there is no definition for Nrightful claim8 in the UCC and since few claims
seeking warranty for infringement lawsuits were brought in the past scholars did not put much
thought into defining it).
84. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
85. See Scheer, supra note 80, at 8 n.25.
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parts.86 Also, if a buyer gives the seller specifications for a product, then the
seller is not liable to the buyer for infringement claims.87
However, the UCC gives no definition for rightful claim and the
statutory language offers little help in constructing a definition.88 The only
insight can be found in Comment 4 of section 2-312 of the UCC, which
states that Neviction8 is not necessary to the buyer4s remedy.89 In other
words, a buyer is not required to prove they were precluded from using the
purchased good to be covered by the provision.90 The UCC drafters further
state that Na buyer4s remedy arises immediately upon receipt of notice of
infringement.891 Although this may be a low standard, the judiciary has
struggled to uniformly lM+QQ /0 )LQ SQOK0K)K/0 /O N+KML)O(H THlK2.892
Prior to 1996, there was little discussion of what constituted a rightful
claim.93 In 1996, the Federal Circuit created some boundaries in Cover v.
Hydramatic Packing Corporation. 94 Although the court did not give a
definition of rightful claim, it did find that a rightful claim did not require a
showing of liability for patent infringement. 95 In 2001, a Pennsylvania
district court attempted to define Nrightful claim8 in 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK
Technologies, Ltd.96 The 84 Lumber court found that an analysis of what
was a rightful claim entailed a comparison between the scope of the patents
at issue and the allegedly infringing products.97 The federal court gave a
very vague indication of how to carry out such a comparison,98 but did hold
that it required an analysis of patent liability.99 Thus, federal courts seemed
to recognize the need for patent-specific analysis.
State courts, on the other hand, have failed to follow the path lit by the
federal courts.100 A series of decisions shows a clear departure from the
86. See Chemtron Inc. v. Aqua Products, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 314, 315 (E.D. Va. 1993).
87. See Bonneau Co. v. AG Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 155, 155 (5th Cir. 1997).
88. Sandrik, supra note 83, at 891.
89. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 4. Comment 4 of this provision was the drafters4 response to a
strongly supported proposal from the New York Patent Law Association to have Nrightful claims8
replaced with Nvalid claims.8 See Sandrik, supra note 83, at 891.
90. See Sandrik, supra note 83, at 891.
91. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 4.
92. Sandrik, supra note 83, at 892.
93. Id. at 892.
94. See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Corp., 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
95. Id. at 1394 (explaining that equating Nrightful claim8 with Npatent liability8 would not
promote judicial economy because parties would be forced to forego settlement and go to trial to
determine whether a rightful claim existed under federal law).
96. 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Technologies, Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
97. Id. at 680.
98. Id. (stating that N[i]f claims of patent infringement are seen as marks on a continuum,
whatever a 6rightful claim4 is would fall somewhere between purely frivolous claims, at one end,
and claims where liability has been proven, at the other8).
99. Id. (holding that N[a determination of rightful claim] cannot be resolved without also
deciding a substantial issue of federal patent law, namely, that there was an adequate basis for [the
third party4s] assertion that defendants4 products infringed [their] patents8).
100. See Sandrik, supra note 83, at 894.
258 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
patent-specific analysis in 84 Lumber.101 First, in Sun Coast Merchandise
Corp. v. Myron Corp.,102 the New Jersey Superior Court held that valid
infringement was not required for a rightful claim. Rather, the third-party4s
claim merely had to be of a substantial nature and unduly disturb the
buyer4s ownership of the goods in question. 103 In Pacific Sunwear of
California, Inc. v. Olaes Enterprises, Inc.,104 the California Court of Appeal
lowered the bar even further. The California court found that Nsubstantial
nature8 could be confusing and held that the standard is whether the claim
was nonfrivolous. 105 Moreover, the court stated that the existence of
litigation is not necessary to establish that a claim is nonfrivolous.106 Since
patents are presumed valid, almost every claim of infringement would
likely meet the nonfrivolous standard.107
Comparing the federal and state approaches, two opposing definitions
of what constitutes a rightful claim can be seen. The federal courts lean
towards requiring the buyer to prove that the patent being asserted has some
validity.108 State courts, on the other hand, require little more than proof that
the buyer4s ownership of the infringing product was disturbed.109 However,
the low standard used in state courts has gained traction on the federal
level.110
The unclear body of law surrounding rightful claim disputes is
problematic to both parties involved in the original sale of goods. Without a
uniform standard, neither party can make an educated decision on when
they arePor are notPprotected. For example, if the buyer gets a demand
letter from a patent troll and decides to pay the license fee, its next step
would be to file a claim against the seller for indemnification. If the buyer
files in a court that requires the troll to have initiated litigation as a
necessary condition to coverage under UCC section 2-312, the buyer will
lose. Furthermore, the buyer would also be estopped from bringing suits in
other, more favorable jurisdictions.111 This leaves the buyer having to pay
101. See id. at 894R95.
102. Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 922 A.2d 782, 788 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
103. See id. at 797.
104. Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
105. See id. at 194 (explaining that nonfrivolous is well defined in the legal context and can
therefore be more readily applied than substantial nature).
106. See id.
107. See Sandrik, supra note 83, at 897.
108. See 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Technologies, Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
109. See Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 922 A.2d 782, 797 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
110. In Phoenix Solutions, Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 683 (N.D. Cal. 2009), a
California District Court adopted the low standard set forth in Pacific Sunwear. See Sandrik,
supra note 83, at 897.
111. NThe preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion . .
. .8 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Issue preclusion is operative where an issue was:
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for something that it had no reason to believe would occur. On the other
hand, if the suit is brought in a jurisdiction with a lower standard of rightful
claim and the buyer wins the indemnification suit, the seller is on the hook
for a licensing fee they took no part in negotiating.
Outside of the problems that arise due to the confusion in determining
what standard to apply, problems associated with the use of UCC section 2-
312 in the context of patent infringement have been recognized. First, when
a buyer believes it is covered by the warranty against infringement it has a
stronger incentive to settle a claim than to defend a possibly frivolous
suit.112 This in turn incentivizes the nuisance-value trolls that are interested
in mass, low-value settlements.113 Second, in patent infringement scenarios,
the normal justifications for warranty law are often not present.114 Warranty
law is understood as a risk allocation device.115 For the warranty against
infringement, the risk is allocated to the seller on the assumption that it has
superior knowledge about the quality or title of goods.116 However, in many
intellectual property infringement cases this asymmetry of information is
not present.117 Third, the warranty against infringement not only does little
to minimize litigation, but actually requires more litigation. In order to
obtain coverage under this warranty the buyer would need to file a lawsuit
against the seller. Therefore, in addition to any infringement lawsuits filed
against a buyer, there will also be an indemnification suit filed by the buyer
against the seller. This adds to the judicial economy problem that the patent
trolls have already exacerbated.
B. CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
In response to some of the concerns seen with leaving infringement
protection up to warranty clauses, some sellers began to add indemnity
(1) actually litigated, (2) determined by a valid and final judgment, and (3) the determination was
essential to the judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION-GEN.
RULE § 27 (1982)a 7LQ+QO/+Qc l N+KML)O(H THlK28 SQ)Q+2K0l)K/0 kl*QS on a motion from one of the
parties, satisfies the three issue preclusion factors. See id. § 27 cmt. d, cmt. h, illus 13.
112. Sandrik, supra note 83, at 889.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 880.
115. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 316R17 (2d ed. 2009).
116. See id. (explaining that the superior knowledge is due to the seller4s position in the market
as one who regularly deals with the goods and who has ownership and oversight over them).
117. See William F. Dudine, Jr., Warranties Against Infringement Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 214, 215 (1964); see also Sandrik, supra note 83, at 902
(giving an example of a buyer who pays a license fee to a patent troll and then successfully seeks
indemnification from the seller). Another interesting feature of the warranty against infringement
is that it requires a relation between the allegedly infringing party and the seller. Imagine a three-
step supply chain where a manufacturer sells to a retailer who sells to a buyer. The retailer may
have to indemnify the buyer for an infringement action but since the retailer was not the subject of
an infringement action they cannot then seek indemnification from the manufacturer.
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provisions in their sales contracts. 118 The standard indemnity provision
would require prompt notice to the seller (licensor) of any infringement
claim and full authority to defend the case on behalf of the licensee.119
Licensors would limit their obligation to three options: (a) obtain the rights
to use the licensed product, (b) modify the product so it was non-infringing,
or (c) terminate the license and refund a pro-rated portion of the purchase
price.120 These standard clauses persisted for many years even though they
had problems of their own.121 In the years following the creation of the
Federal Circuit and subsequent reforms in the patent system, 122 more
problems arose that plagued modern usage of patent infringement
indemnity clauses in sales contracts.
The changes that the creation of the Federal Circuit imposed upon the
patent system ultimately resulted in an increase in patent infringement
claims and much higher damage awards for those that were successful.123
This led to buyers (licensees) and sellers (licensors) demanding extra
protection in the indemnity clauses with the resulting clause often reflecting
bargaining power rather than a rational distribution of risk and reward
between buyer and seller. 124 For example, it is common for a large
enterprise with substantial leverage that is buying products to insist on full
indemnity with no restrictions.125 However, if the licensor has inadequate
resources to defend a claim or pay an adverse judgment, the buyer4s
insistence on full indemnity does little to shift their risk.126
118. See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Intellectual Property Indemnity Clauses, B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F., 2013, at 1, 2.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id. (explaining that option (c) could be detrimental if the product in question was critical to
a business because even if a comparable non-infringing product was available, the buyer would
have to find, implement, and migrate all data to the new system, which would be expensive, time-
consuming, and risky).
122. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, circuit courts were relatively hostile to patents,
resulting in a small percentage of litigated patents being enforced upon appeal, and when a patent
was found valid, the damages were generally measured as a reasonable royalty, which were
usually in the Nlow single digitsa8 Id. The Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals. As the Circuit is primarily populated by patent practitioners, it casts a kinder eye
on patents, holding them valid two-thirds of the time. Id. The Federal Circuit also expanded the
scope of damages by allowing claims for potential profit, lost profit, and treble damages where
there was willful infringement and expanded the range of patentable things to include computer
software, forms of life, and business methods. Id. In some cases, damage awards skyrocketed to
millions of dollars due to the volume of business that was dependent on the allegedly infringing
product. Id. Patentees realized the potential for financial gain and began filing more infringement
claims. Id.
123. See id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. The buyer is only protected for as much money as the seller is worth. Therefore, in
the situations where the buyer is much larger than the seller, the indemnity clause Ncreate[s] the
appearance, but not the reality, of a transfer of infringement risk.8 Id. at 4. The buyer has the
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On the other side of the spectrum, sellers with more power than buyers
will add exceptions to the indemnity clauses that make them all but
illusory.127 For example, a common exception would be to Ntechnology
already in use at the time the patent is issued8 and Npatents known to the
licensee.8 128 The Nalready in use8 clause basically states that if the
licensor4s product already infringes at the time of licensing then the buyer
cannot seek indemnity. 129 This is a necessary requirement for a patent
infringement claim and essentially shifts the burden of determining whether
the product infringes any patents to the buyer. 130 Another common
exception is to only provide indemnity for final judgments of
infringement.131 This leaves the buyer with deciding whether to take the
substantial risk and expense of ongoing litigation or to settle and pay to
make the claim go away. 132 A final typical exclusion exists when the
licensed technology is combined with other technology not supplied by the
seller. 133 In much of the technology world, products are sold with the
intention of being combined with others so virtually every infringement
claim will have a combination that is excluded from indemnification.134
Current patent warranty and indemnification practices advance an
effective appearance, but in reality, are flawed. Whether it is the uncertainty
of the warranty against infringement in the UCC or unfair indemnification
clauses in sales contracts, purchasers of goods are not adequately protected
against patent infringement claims for which they should have little to no
obligation. A new approach should not only protect innocent purchasers of
goods, but also help minimize the incentives that patent trolls have in
targeting them.
III. THE CURRENT PATENT REFORM PROPOSAL
Recent patent reform proposals in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate have many commonalities. The two discussed in this section
are fee shifting and a set of interconnected reforms that this Article calls
heightened pleading requirements.135
power to bankrupt the seller, but this may not be in the buyer4s interest if the seller provides a









135. These pleading requirements are aimed at limiting early discovery. While not technically
in the pleading phase of litigation, these discovery reforms would become an important factor in
deciding whether or not to continue with litigation during its early stages. Accordingly, this Note
groups such discovery reforms with the other pleading reforms.
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A. FEE SHIFTING
The NAmerican Rule8 of litigation is that each party is only obligated to
pay their own attorney4s fees, regardless of the outcome.136 Nonetheless,
there are many federal and state statutes in the United States that authorize
some version of fee shifting.137 On the opposite end of the spectrum lies the
NEnglish Rule,8 where the losing party pays a substantial portion, if not all,
of the winner4s attorney4s fees. 138 Arguments have been made that
exceptions to the American Rule are made in an effort to deter lawsuits that
use abusive litigation practices or have questionable merit.139 Fee shifting
statutes can be one-way or two-way. 140 Two-way fee shifting allows
attorney fees to be shifted regardless of which party wins.141 One-way fee
shifting only allows attorney fees to be shifted when a predetermined party,
either plaintiff or defendant, wins.142 Within those categories, fee shifting
can either be mandatory or discretionary, each variation having different
effects on litigation.143 As explained in Part I, patent trolls use the American
Rule and fear of the costs of litigation to coerce defendants into paying
licensing fees. The argument made by scholars is that a more liberal
approach to fee shifting in patent infringement cases would help curb patent
troll behavior.144
There has been substantial discussion on the effects an adoption of fee
shifting would have on civil litigation.145 One of the main arguments from
proponents of the English Rule is that it discourages speculative litigation
136. John F. Vargo, .#' =B'>!+EA 08X' @A =::@>A'R U'' =XX@+E:!@AY .#' OA[8>') 2'><@A1<
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993). There is also the NEnglish Rule8 whereby
the nonprevailing party must pay the prevailing party4s attorneys4 fees. Douglas C. Rennie, Rule
82 and Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Alaska1s English Rule on Federal Civil
Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1R2 (2012).
137. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 370 (2012)
(Nn!mlose to 200 federal statutes and 4,000 state statutes authorize attorney4s feesa8).
138. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140 (2012).
139. Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting Attorney1s
Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 351 (2013) (citing Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys1 Fees
for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 619 (1983)).
140. See Rowe, supra note 138, at 140R41 (explaining that two-way fee shifting allows attorney
fees to be shifted regardless of which party wins and that one-way fee shifting only allows
attorney fees to be shifted when a predetermined party wins).
141. See id. at 141.
142. See id.
143. Discretionary fee shifting requires the court to determine whether one party should pay the
fees of the other, whereas mandatory fee shifting requires the losing party to pay automatically
upon judgment. See Chien, supra note 137, at 370R71 (explaining that the NEnglish Rule8 is a
two-way mandatory shift and most United States fee shifting statutes are discretionary).
144. Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) [hereinafter Protecting
Small Business Hearing] (record submission of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (statement of Starwood Hotels
& Resorts Worldwide).
145. Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs:
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 345 (1990).
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and limits the leverage weak cases have when threatening to inflict the cost
of litigation.146 Theoretically, a plaintiff will forego filing Nlong-shot cases,8
which are only attractive for the high potential payoff, and Nimposition-
based cases,8 whose value arises solely due to litigation cost, if he is
responsible for defendant4s reasonable legal costs. 147 Furthermore,
supporters of the current system will admit that Nwell-meaning persons
placed in danger of open-ended legal jeopardy may suspend activities that
are privately profitable and sometimes socially useful.8148 This is exactly
the type of behavior and negative effect exhibited by patent trolls, which is
why improved fee shifting regimes have been included in almost every
patent reform bill recently introduced in the United States Congress.149
Fee shifting in patent litigation is controlled by 35 U.S.C. §285.150 It
states that N[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.8151 The meaning of Nexceptionable8 had, until
recently, made it nearly impossible for a judge to shift fees in a patent
litigation case.152 However, on April 29, 2014, the Supreme Court4s ruling
in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. marked the
beginning of a new era in fee shifting for patent lawsuits.153
Prior to the ruling in Octane Fitness, the controlling precedent on what
constituted an Nexceptional8 case came from Brooks Furniture
Manufacturing v. Dutailier International, Inc.154 In Brooks Furniture, the
Federal Circuit held that a case is exceptional only when there has been
material inappropriate conduct.155 Absent misconduct, the Federal Circuit
146. Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1161
(1996).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1189.
149. See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845,
113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (N[N]otwithstanding [35 U.S.C.] section 285, the Court shall award the
recovery of full costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including
reasonable attorney4s fees . . . upon the entry of a final judgment . . . .8); Patent Abuse Reduction
Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 5 (2013) (NSection 285 of title 35, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows . . . 6nt]he court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorney4s fees a a a a48); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (NSection
285 of title 35, United States Code, is amended to read as follows . . . . 6The court shall award, to a
prevailing party, reasonable fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with a
civil action . . . relating to patents . . . .48).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
151. Id. This is a two-way discretionary fee shifting regime.
152. John F. O4Rourke, Patrick Soon & Rebecca Bellow, Silver, Garlic and Attorney1s Fees, 56
ORANGE CTY. LAW. 28, 29 (2014).
153. See Martin E. Hsia, The Supreme Court1s Intellectual (Property) Year: A Whirlwind Tour,
18 HAW. B.J. 26, 27R28 (2014) (summarizing the Supreme Court4s ruling in Octane Fitness); see
also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
154. Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int4l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381R82 (2005).
155. Id. at 1381 (explaining that material inappropriate conduct would be Nwillful infringement,
fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or
unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions8).
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held that fees may only be assessed when the litigation is brought in
subjective bad faith and is objectively baseless.156 However, the Federal
Circuit continued, there is a presumption of good faith in asserting a patent,
therefore, the improper conduct must be established by Nclear and
convincing evidence.8 157 In practice, this standard was insurmountable,
making fee shifting in patent cases all but illusory. 158 Octane Fitness
changed this.
In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court decided that N[t]he framework
established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it
impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
courts.8159 The Supreme Court went on to hold that Nan 6exceptional case4 is
simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party4s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in
which the case was litigated.8 160 The Supreme Court also changed the
evidentiary requirement from the Nclear and convincing evidence8 standard
espoused in Brooks Furniture to a Nsimple discretionary inquiry8 with no
specific evidentiary burden.161
On the same day Octane Fitness was decided, the Supreme Court also
decided Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems. 162 In
Highmark, the Supreme Court held that the decision to award attorney4s
fees is a matter of discretion given to the district court, and that decision is
to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.163 The practical effect of
these two decisions is to give district courts wide latitude in deciding
whether to issue fees and to make that decision much less likely to be
overturned.164
Many believed that the Octane Fitness and Highmark decisions leveled
the playing field by giving alleged infringers an Nadditional tool . . . to fight
back against plaintiffs [asserting] meritless claims . . . in hopes of a quick
payoff.8165 Although Octane Fitness is a relatively new decision, making it
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1382.
158. Chien, supra note 137, at 377 n.330, n.331 (explaining that there are around 3000 patent
case filings on average per year and in 2011 there were only 21 awards of attorney4s fees with
only half of those going to defendants); Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1752 (N[Brooks Furniture] is
so demanding that it would appear to render [35 U.S.C.] § 285 largely superfluous.8).
159. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. In general, there are two ways that fee shifting regimes
impose fees: mandatory or discretionary. See Chien, supra note 137, at 370. Section 285 of the
Patent Act was intended to be used in a discretionary nature and the Federal Circuit4s formulation
in Brooks Furniture Nsuperimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently
flexible.8 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753, 1756.
160. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
161. Id. at 1758.
162. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
163. Id. at 1748.
164. =4:/(+IQc supra note 152, at 30.
165. Bijal V. Vakil, Thomas Flynn & Nathan Zhang, Supreme Court Issues Two IHigh-
Octane5 Decisions to Address Abusive Patent Litigation Practices, WHITE & CASE PUBS. (Apr.
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difficult to accurately determine the effects it has on patent litigation, early
statistical analysis indicates that they are minimal.166 Glaser Weil surveyed
the seventy-five district court decisions involving fee awards that arose
between the decision in Octane Fitness on April 29, 2014, and October 28,
2014.167 They found that 18% of motions for fee awards were granted and
another 13% of motions were granted in part, totaling about 29% of
motions resulting in an award.168 While Glaser Weil admitted they did not
have pre-Octane statistics to determine whether this grant rate was a
significant change, the most interesting finding had to do with which party
was awarded the fees.169 Of the twenty-three cases where fees were granted
in full or in part, thirteen were granted in the plaintiffs4 favor and ten in
defendants4 favor.170
The research indicates that the lowered standard set in Octane Fitness
affects both sides of litigation, helping both plaintiffs, including patent
trolls, and defendants get their fees awarded.171 Therefore, a patent litigation
fee shifting regime intended to help protect defendants from patent trolls
needs a structural change that does more than merely alter the legal standard
required to trigger it. Two-way fee shifting regimes, like the one currently
used in patent litigation, are generally meant to discourage nuisance suits172
and have been criticized for not having a uniform effect.173 Conversely,
one-way fee shifting regimes are instituted to achieve a specific policy
objective.174 Here, the policy objective is to minimize the abusive litigation
tactics used by patent trolls. In furtherance of this objective, members of
Congress have been attempting to get a bill enacted that would turn section
285 of Title 35 of the United States Code into a one-way fee shifting
statute.
The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes
(SHIELD) Act was introduced on February 27, 2013175 with its main goal to
29, 2014), http://www.whitecase.com/articles/042014/supreme-court-issues-two-high-octane-
decisions-to-address-abusive-patent-litigation-practices/#.VG0SJYfSoSd.
166. See Andrew Choung, Half a Year Since Octane, GLASER WEIL IP FILE (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.intellectualpropertyfilegw.com/?p=385 (conducting a study on fee awards in district
court patent cases in the six months following Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014)).
167. See id.
168. See id. (finding that of the seventy-five motions for fee awards, fifty were denied, thirteen




172. Rowe, supra note 138, at 147.
173. See Chien, supra note 137, at 373 (explaining that empirical evidence undercuts the
assumption that a two-way fee shifting regime lowers the amount of litigation, and further, that
Nthe task of assessing whether they worked to deter frivolous suits was impossible.8).
174. Id. at 375R76.
175. Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong.
(2013).
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make patent trolls take financial responsibility for their actions. 176 The
SHIELD Act would award a prevailing defendant full costs if the plaintiff
did not meet at least one set of conditions.177 The conditions exempt from
the mandatory one-way shift include a plaintiff that is the original inventor,
has made a substantial investment in the patent, is a university, or is an
organization whose primary purpose is to commercialize the technology.178
The SHIELD Act is an excellent attempt at creating a one-way fee shifting
regime that imposes fees on patent trolls while not discouraging plaintiffs
with meritorious claims who would not be able to pay an opponent4s fees.
However, the bill stalled when Jason Chaffetz and Peter DeFazio, the
Representatives that introduced the SHIELD Act, stated they would defer to
the much more comprehensive Innovation Act introduced in the 113th
Congressional session.179 While the Innovation Act does cover more aspects
of patent reform, its fee shifting section is designed to create a two-way
mandatory regime.180 Nonetheless, the Innovation Act passed the House of
Representatives 325-91, but then stalled in the Senate during the 113th
Congressional term. 181 Even though this patent reform bill was
unsuccessful, House Judiciary Committee Chair Bob Goodlatte
reintroduced a similar bill, under the same name, in the House of
Representatives in 2015 that, at the time of this publication, was
recommended by committee for further consideration.182
Patent litigation fee shifting is a volatile subject at this point in time.
Whether the current regime is kept, with the lower threshold set in Octane
Fitness, or a new fee shifting regime is created through legislation has yet
to be determined. However, neither scenario provides adequate protection
against patent trolls. There have been multiple empirical studies183 on the
effects of fee shifting and all tend to agree that fee shifting statutes do not
have the effect intended. While the results are more prominent in studies
176. Ryan Hauer, Another Attempt at Patent Reform: S.1013 the Patent Abuse Reduction Act of
2013, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 378 (2014).
177. See H.R. 845 § 2(a)(4).
178. See id. § 2(d).
179. See Jimm Phillips, Goodlatte Bows Innovation Act to Target Patent Litigation Abuse,
WASH. INTERNETDAILY, Oct. 24, 2013c l) 7/Slh4* UQj*a
180. See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3(b) (2013).
181. See Erica Teichert, Congress to Push Patent Troll Bill in 2015, Goodlatte Says, LAW360
(Nov. 18, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/597447/congress-to-push-patent-troll-
bill-in-2015-goodlatte-says. Interestingly, instead of introducing the same Innovation Act that
passed the House, Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy altered the bill4s text and introduced
it into the Senate under a different name. Leahy removed the fee shifting provision from the
Innovation Act because it appeared to be the most controversial part of the bill. Leahy later stated
that he withdrew his version of the bill from the Senate due to pressure he received from Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid. Id.
182. H.R. 9 (114th): Innovation Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
183. See Rennie, supra note 136, at 20R25 (describing the various empirical studies on fee
shifting statutes).
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involving two-way fee shifting, the studies indicate that one-way fee
shifting does not always promote the specific policy objective in mind.
A study involving a mandatory two-way fee shifting rule for medical
malpractice cases concluded that it was unclear whether the rule had a
deterrence effect on low merit claims.184 The researchers noted that any
increase in dropped claims may have been the result of plaintiffs Ndropping
weak claims [in favor of pursuing] nuisance strategies.8185 Multiple studies
have also been done on Alaska4s statewide two-way fee shifting law that is
essentially mandatory.186 In one study, the researchers found that civil filing
rates in Alaska were not substantially different from rates in other states.187
The researchers suggested that Nif fee shifting affects case filing trends and
trial rates in Alaska, the effects are complex and may result in a net
situation little different from that found in states that do not shift fees.8188
Another study found that the Alaska Rule was not an effective means for
reducing meritless litigation. 189 Finally, a study focusing on Nlow-
probability-of-prevailing8 plaintiffs in a two-way fee shifting regime
concluded that plaintiffs who bring weak claims in such a regime are more
likely to go to trial because they know that trials often have erroneous
outcomes.190 These conclusions are all in line with the findings, discussed
above, that post-Octane Fitness fee awards did not indicate any enhanced
protection against patent trolls.191 Therefore, a continuation of the current
two-way fee shifting regime in patent litigation does not look to be able to
provide adequate protection for victims of patent troll litigation.
Theoretically, a one-way fee shifting regime would fix many of these
problems. By only requiring patent troll plaintiffs to pay the defendant4s
fees, all incentives caused by the prospect of having their own fees paid are
removed. Ideally, this would entail less risk of unintended consequences.192
Although not many studies focus on one-way fee shifting, and those that do
usually deal with pro-plaintiff rules intended to promote access to the
courts, their principles can still be informative for a pro-defendant patent
184. Id. at 21R22 (the fee shifting statute involved in this study was ultimately repealed at the
urging of the Florida Medical Association, the group that argued for its enactment in the first
place, when it appeared that low merit claim filings actually increased).
185. Id. at 22.
186. See Chien, supra note 137, at 373 (noting that Alaska is the only state within the United
States that has this type of fee shifting statute that so closely resembles the NEnglish Rule8);
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a) (NExcept as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the
prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney4s fees calculated under this rule . . . a8).
187. Rennie, supra note 136, at 22.
188. Id. at 23.
189. Id. at 43.
190. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-
Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 152 (1998). See also Chien, supra
note 137, at 372.
191. See Choung, supra note 166 (finding that, in the six months after Octane Fitness, fees were
actually awarded more often for plaintiffs than defendants).
192. Chien, supra note 137, at 376.
268 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
fee shifting statute. 193 In the context of a pro-plaintiff fee shift in
constitutional tort cases intended to increase filings, a study found that there
was only minimal evidence of such an effect.194 Therefore, it follows that a
pro-defendant fee shifting regime intended to lower the filing rate would
not likely have its intended effect.
As the empirical studies show, neither type of fee shifting has been
proven to adequately carry out its objective. It has been admitted that
isolating the effects of fee shifting can be challenging due to differences in
jurisdictions utilizing versions of the English and American Rule. 195
However, that each of the studies discussed above have reached similar
conclusions, along with the fact that current statistics in patent fee shifting
are in accordance with them, gives weight to their merit.
B. HEIGHTENED PLEADINGREQUIREMENTS
One of the patent trolls4 most effective strategies is the use of demand
letters. Patent infringement demand letters are intended to be a means of
proving willful infringement. 196 If it is proven that a party willfully
infringed a patent, courts may award increased damages. 197 Therefore,
parties acting in good faith will ensure their demand letters are as detailed
as possible to increase their chances of proving willful infringement.198
Patent trolls, however, abuse this litigation device and engage in bad faith
negotiations, leveraging the high cost of a successful defense to obtain a
settlement well below that cost.199 Often, the predatory activity begins and
ends with a demand letter. 200 However, demand letters are not always
predatory and are often used by non NPEs to remedy a situation without
filing a lawsuit.201 A good faith demand letter informs the recipient which
193. Id.
194. Rennie, supra note 136, at 25.
195. Id. at 20.
196. See Kevin Raudebaugh, Willful Infringement After Seagate: How the Willfulness Standard
has Changed and What Attorneys Should Know About It, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH., 2009, at
1, 7 (explaining that demand letters are used to prove the alleged infringer had knowledge they
were infringing).
197. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952) (N[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.8); Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact
of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 57 (2001) (showing that
courts have interpreted the increased damages to be a form of punitive damages used to deter
deliberate infringement of valid patents).
198. See Raudebaugh, supra note 196, at 7. Note that until recently, upon receiving a demand
letter, a potential infringer had an affirmative duty to determine whether or not he or she was
infringing. This usually entailed acquiring an expensive opinion of counsel. However, in 2007, the
CAFC removed the affirmative duty to obtain an opinion of counsel. See id. at 5R6. See also In re
Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (2007).
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patent is infringed, which product of theirs is infringing, and how it
infringes. 202 Predatory demand letters, on the other hand, are meant to
deceive the recipient and force them into a settlement before the merits of
the infringement claim can be judicially addressed.203 A successful patent
troll demand letter results in the troll obtaining a licensing fee from the
recipient without spending any money on litigation.204 To compound the
problem, patent trolls use a maze of shell corporations to send the demand
letters, making it hard to identify and litigate against the troll. 205 Both
houses of Congress have recently introduced bills to address this problem,
k() 0QK)LQ+ O/(0S )LQK+ jlh )/ )LQ <+Q*KSQ0)4* SQ*Ia206
The nuisance-value patent troll often sends hundreds or even thousands
of identical demand letters to retailers and end users of commercial
products to sweep in as many low value settlements as possible.207 These
predatory demand letters provide very little information to the recipient.
They often do not identify what patent or claim is allegedly infringed,
allege infringement of an expired patent, or state vague theories of
infringement.208 For example, a retailer received a demand letter from an
NPE only two paragraphs in length claiming infringement based on
Ntechnology that enables debit cards and gift cards to read and process
information via the magnetic strip on the back of the card.8209 The retailer
consulted an attorney who informed them they used a different technology
than the one asserted.210 The NPE refused to drop their settlement demand
and instead lowered the offer.211 The retailer eventually paid the NPE just to
make it go away, and then paid five figures in legal fees.212 Recipients of
demand letters are forced to choose between costly litigation to challenge
the letter or compliance with the letter4s offer, regardless of how weak the
claims of infringement are.213
If the recipient of the demand letter decides to take their chances in
court, that recipient will find that the entity sending the demand letter is not




205. Hauer, supra note 176, at 371.
206. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3(e) (2013) (N[I]t is an abuse of the patent
system and against public policy for a party to send out purposely evasive demand letters to end
users alleging patent infringement.8); id. § 4(a)(3) (2013); Patent Transparency and Improvements
Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. §§ 3(a)(1)(A), 5(a) (2013).
207. Hayden W. Gregory, From the HillKCombatting So-Called Patent Trolls: Demand Letters
Demand Attention, 7 LANDSLIDE, MayRJune 2014, at 1, 2.
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purchase, hold, and assert their patents.214 Frequently, the only asset for
each shell is the patent it is asserting.215 This makes it nearly impossible for
the demand letter recipient to determine the party it is actually litigating
against, since Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1 does not require a
litigant to disclose a parent corporation unless it holds 10% or more of its
stock.216 This is problematic for two reasons. First, a shell company whose
only asset is a patent has very little to produce in discovery, and therefore
has significantly lower costs during this stage of litigation.217 Second, if the
defendant prevails and is awarded damages they are faced with a new set of
hurdles. These shell companies are often judgment proof.218 The prevailing
defendant would have to identify the ultimate parent corporation,
purposefully made difficult by a maze of shell corporations, and then
attempt to pierce the corporate veil. 219 Patent trolls understand how to
structure their shell corporations in a way to provide extra levels of
protection against veil piercing actions.220 Furthermore, courts are reluctant
to pierce the corporate veil, and the protective structure used by patent trolls
makes it particularly difficult to do so.221
In recent years, Congress has attempted fix these problems by making
three amendments to Title 35 of the United States Code. The three
amendments would result in increased pleading requirements, enhanced
joinder provisions, and limitations on discovery. 222 These amendments
work together to minimize the unfair advantages patent trolls have. The
increased pleading requirements would require disclosure of any parent
corporation that has an interest in the patent. 223 Under the new joinder
214. Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2012) (finding that one well known patent troll had 1276 shell companies associated with it).
215. See Protecting Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Food Marketing
Institute).
216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(a)(1).
217. Sid Venkatesan, Examining the Effects of Patent-Troll Legislation on Startups,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/03/effects-of-patent-troll-
legislation-on-startups (stating that defendants may have a lot of highly technical documents that
require a large number of attorney hours to sift through, whereas the troll has minimal
documents).
218. Peter Schechter, Guest Editorial: Throwing Trolls Off the Bridge, PATENTLYRO BLOG
(Mar. 10, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/guest-editorial-throwing-trolls-off-the-
bridge.html.
219. Feldman, supra note 214, at 40 (explaining that the owners and investors of the shell
corporation are regarded as separate and distinct entities and the only way to hold them liable for
actions of the shell corporation is to pierce the corporate veil).
220. Id. at 40R41 (NA key predicate in piercing the corporate veil concerns the presence or
absence of distinct legal entities. Some [patent trolls] are structured so that each layer is a distinct
legal entity, providing a measure of protection.8).
221. Id.
222. See Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309,
113th Cong. (2013); Patent Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong.
(2013).
223. S. 1013 § 2(a); H.R. 3309 § 4(a).
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provisions, a defendant would be allowed to join the Ninterested8 parent
corporation and hold them liable. 224 Finally, the discovery amendment
would limit early discovery to Ncore documentary evidence.8 225 The
pleading requirements and joinder provisions would render the practice of
using large amounts of shell corporations obsolete. 226 The discovery
limitations would drastically decrease discovery costs until the scope of the
infringement claim can be narrowed, at which point the defendant would be
able to escape the lawsuit for a low settlement or possibly show their device
is outside the scope of the patent.227
While this three pronged approach could theoretically have a strong
deterrent effect on abusive patent troll tactics, the reality is not as bright.
First, these amendments would not impose any hardships on the patent troll
business model until they file a lawsuit. This leaves them free to continue
sending mass numbers of vague and misleading demand letters228 and since,
as discussed above, many claims begin and end with a demand letter, it is
not certain that this approach will have much of an effect on nuisance-value
patent trolls.229 If anything, implementation of these amendments may cause
patent trolls to shift most of their resources to pursue nuisance-value tactics.
However, this discussion is arguably moot because both bills proposing the
three pronged approach stalled in Congress.230
A different bill was later introduced into the Senate that had specific
provisions giving penalties for bad faith demand letters. 231 The Patent
224. S. 1013 § 3; H.R. 3309 § 3(c).
225. S. 1013 § 4(a) (N[I]f the court determines that a ruling relating to the construction for terms
used in a patent claim asserted in the complaint is required, discovery shall be limited, until such
ruling, to information necessary for the court to determine the meaning of the terms used in the
patent claim . . . .8); H.R. 3309 § 3(d) (N[I]f the court determines that a ruling relating to the
construction of terms used in a patent claim asserted in the complaint is required, discovery shall
be limited, until such ruling is issued, to information necessary for the court to determine the
meaning of the terms used in the patent claim . . . .8).
226. Hauer, supra note 176, at 390 (explaining that once the parent corporation is disclosed, it
can then be joined and held liable for a judgment entered against it).
227. See id. at 392.
228. The Innovation Act does mention demand letters in section 3(e), stating that N[d]emand
letters sent should, at the least, include basic information about the patent in question, what is
being infringed, and how it is being infringed,8 and any litigation stemming from purposely
evasive demand letters is Na fraudulent or deceptive practice and an exceptional circumstance.8
H.R. 3309 §3(e). However, if a patent troll does not intend to litigate, they will not suffer any
consequences for sending vague demand letters.
229. See Protecting Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Food Marketing
Institute).
230. The Patent Abuse Reduction Act never made it out of its initial Senate committee. The
Innovation Act, although it passed the House of Representatives, stalled in the Senate. S. 1013
(113th): Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1013 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014); Ryan Davis, IP
Bills Have Momentum in New Congress, LAW360 (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:53 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/591038/ip-bills-have-momentum-in-new-congress.
231. See Patent Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 5(a)
(2013).
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Transparency Improvements Act of 2013 would make sending large
quantities of false, vague, and misleading demand letters an unfair or
deceptive act for purposes of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.232
This allows the FTC to sanction patent trolls engaging in demand letter
tactics deemed to be in bad faith. However, some believe that this will do
little to prevent abusive demand letters because patent trolls can continue to
send them as long as they rework the letter to avoid misleading
statements.233 The bill does, however, require all assignments of a patent
that alters the Nultimate parent entity8 to be disclosed to the USPTO.234
While this will allow for the identification of the parent entity prior to the
filing of a lawsuit, the bill does not include a joinder provision. Therefore a
defendant will still have the difficult task of piercing the corporate veil.
Either approach described above will not adequately minimize abusive
patent troll tactics. Implementation of the three prongs in the Patent Abuse
Reduction Act and Innovation Act would merely shift the field of patent
trolls to focus on nuisance tactics. Implementation of an amendment that
makes bad faith demand letters a violation of FTC law would be nothing
more than a slight annoyance to patent trolls that could be avoided with
minor changes to the wording in their demand letters. Furthermore, a
combination of the two would not have an added effect because neither
approach relies on the other.
IV. THE CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION
The general rule courts follow when faced with multiple, similar
lawsuits is to allow the suit filed first to proceed and stay subsequently filed
suits.235 There is an exception to this rule in patent litigation called the
Ncustomer suit exception,8 where a later filed action Nbrought by the
manufacturer of infringing goods takes precedence over a suit by the patent
owner against customers of the manufacturer.8236 This rule is based on
recognition that Nthe manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer
suit.8237 The rule has been further justified on the grounds that Na decision
in the suit between [the patentee and manufacturer] would settle the issue
finally and prevent further suits.8238 Therefore, allowing the manufacturer to
step in with a declaratory judgment could render all suits against customers
moot if the product is found not to be infringing.
232. See id.
233. See Davis, supra note 230.
234. See S. 1720 § 3(b).
235. Love, supra note 28, at 1615.
236. Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
237. Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737R38 (1st Cir. 1977).
238. Delamere Co. v. Taylor-Bell Co., 199 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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However, more recent Federal Circuit interpretations of the rule have
restricted its availability.239 The Federal Circuit has stated that Nthe guiding
principles in the customer suit exception cases are efficiency and judicial
economy . . . .8240 Further, judicial economy is determined by looking at
three factors: N(1) whether customer defendants are 6mere resellers4 or
6mere customers4 of the manufacturer4s product; (2) whether the customers
agree to be bound by any decision in the manufacturer4s case; and (3)
whether the manufacturer is the sole source of the infringing products.8241
The first factor renders the exception inapplicable to cases where the
customer uses the manufacturer4s infringing product in their larger device.
For example, in Air Products and Chemicals v. MG Nitrogen Services, the
customer was allegedly infringing a patent by using the manufacturer4s
membrane equipment in the customer4s nitrogen production units.242 The
court held that since the customer was not merely a reseller of the
manufacturer4s membrane equipment, the customer suit exception did not
apply.243 The second factor will often be stipulated to by the customers. The
third factor renders the exception inapplicable where the customer
purchased from multiple manufacturers. 244 For example, in Emerson
Electric v. Black & Decker, the customer suit exception was deemed
inapplicable because the customer purchased the allegedly infringing item
from two separate manufacturers.245 Finally, since high-tech products are
mostly constructed by sourcing component parts from multiple suppliers
and since these products are a dominant source of patent suits, it is
increasingly difficult to apply the customer suit exception.246
When granting a manufacturer4s request to stay lawsuits brought
against their customers, courts will use phraseology such as Nthe
manufacturer4s presumed greater interest in defending8 and Nto guard
against possibility of abuse.8247 However, the more recent developments in
customer suit exception jurisprudence seem to be losing sight of its initial
purpose. A more liberal application of the customer suit exception would
allow more manufacturers to get involved in the action and would likely
result in a decrease in the overall amount of nuisance-value patent litigation
filings.
239. Love, supra note 28, at 1617.
240. Tegic Commc4ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
241. Love, supra note 28, at 1618 (citing .'$!+ 9@BB+1A<, 458 F.3d at 1343).
242. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. MG Nitrogen Servs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357 (D. Del.
2001).
243. Id.
244. Love, supra note 28, at 1618R19.
245. Id. at 1619 (citing Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 241 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
246. See id. at 1618R19.
247. Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.2d 1078, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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One of the driving forces behind the customer suit exception is the
theory that Nthe manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit.8248
There are several distinct benefits of getting the manufacturer involved in
the litigation. First, manufacturers have a stronger incentive to litigate an
infringement suit than their customers.249 Through claim construction, the
manufacturer can set the scope of the patent in a way that allows them to
design around the patent, thereby eliminating the need to make royalty
payments.250 Also, by vigorously defending the infringement action, the
manufacturer will send a message to other patent trolls that it is not an easy
target, thus minimizing future actions against itself and its customers.251
Second, the manufacturer is in a much better position to litigate an
infringement action than their customers. 252 In general, customers have
little, if any, understanding of the field of the patent and often do not
understand what role the allegedly infringing component plays in their
device.253 On the other hand, the manufacturer4s in-house knowledge and
expertise is helpful in finding prior art, expert analysis, and, most
importantly, establishing noninfringement.254 Finally, manufacturers are in
the best position to value the patent rights.255 The manufacturer4s in-house
knowledge of both the product and the marketplace make them the best
party to provide evidence in determining reasonable royalty damages.256
Therefore, since overcompensating the patentee can impede the very
innovation the Patent Act is meant to foster, it is socially beneficial for the
manufacturer to be defending the infringement action.257
If more manufacturers were able to routinely defend infringement
lawsuits against their customers, nuisance-value infringement actions would
likely decline. Initially, patent trolls would have to begin strategically
targeting the customers of manufacturers that do not defend their
customers.258 Eventually, this will cause customers to make the majority of
their purchases from manufacturers who are willing to defend their
248. Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737R38 (1st Cir. 1977).
249. Love, supra note 28, at 1621.
250. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent
Threats, 23 SANTA CLARACOMPUTER&HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 161 (2006).
251. Id.
252. Love, supra note 28, at 1626.
253. Id. at 1628.
254. See id. at 1628R29.
255. See id. at 1631.
256. See id. (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (setting out factors to consider when determining reasonable royalty damages).
257. See Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL4Y 193, 214 (1999).
258. Love, supra note 28, at 1631.
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product.259 Thus, the target pool for patent trolls engaging in nuisance-value
litigation will start to decline.260
By expanding the customer suit exception, either through Congress or
judicial action, the field of targets for nuisance-value patent trolls would be
largely diminished. The first step would be to modify the test given by the
Federal Circuit. A modification allowing for a manufacturer whose product
is the main component of the allegedly infringing device would promote a
more liberal application of the exception. Furthermore, allowing the
manufacturer to step in for its customers as early as the demand letter stage
would minimize the mass demand letter tactic used by many patent trolls.
CONCLUSION
NPEs come in all shapes and sizes, but it is widely agreed that those
who pursue numerous end users for the purpose of extracting licensing fees
are unfairly exploiting the patent system. Many of the current and proposed
solutions offer little, if any, protection for this class of targets. However,
one proposal, allowing for a more liberal application of the customer suit
exception, has promise. By allowing the manufacturer of the product
allegedly infringing a patent, rather than the end user of the product, to
litigate the action would promote a more proper valuation of the patent in
question. In turn, this would lower the appeal of the end user as a target for
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